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Abstract
A rational behavior of a consumer is analyzed when the user participates in
a Peak Time Rebate (PTR) mechanism, which is a demand response (DR)
incentive program based on a baseline. A multi-stage stochastic programming
is proposed from the demand side in order to understand the rational decisions.
The consumer preferences are modeled as a risk-averse function under additive
uncertainty. The user chooses the optimal consumption profile to maximize his
economic benefits for each period. The stochastic optimization problem is solved
backward in time. A particular situation is developed when the System Operator
(SO) uses consumption of the previous interval as the household-specific baseline
for the DR program. It is found that a rational consumer alters the baseline
in order to increase the well-being when there is an economic incentive. As
results, whether the incentive is lower than the retail price, the user shifts his
load requirement to the baseline setting period. On the other hand, if the
incentive is greater than the regular energy price, the optimal decision is that
the user spends the maximum possible energy in the baseline setting period and
reduces the consumption at the PTR time. This consumer behavior produces
more energy consumption in total considering all periods. In addition, the user
with high uncertainty level in his energy pattern should spend less energy than
a predictable consumer when the incentive is lower than the retail price.
Keywords: Demand Response, Peak Time Rebate, Stochastic Programming,
Baseline.
1. Introduction
In the smart grid concept, DR is a mechanism implemented by SO to equi-
librate the load with power generation by modifying consumption. The main
purpose of this kind of program is to curtail load at the peak demand times for
maintaining the security of the transmission assets, avoiding to exceed the limit
capacity of generators and preventing power outages. Therefore, DR is one of
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2the most crucial parts of the future smart grid [28] due to the main objectives of
the DR is peak clipping, valley filling and load shifting on the power profile. An
important question in DR program design is how to improve the demand pro-
file, namely, to control the noncritical loads at the residential, commercial and
industrial levels for matching supply and demand. For instance, DR program
might motivate changes in electricity usage by changing the price of electricity
or giving an incentive payment.
There are several DR programs implemented as part of strategies to reduce
peak power (because the demand trend is growing). In [21, 4] are shown a com-
plete summary regarding mathematical models, pricing methods, optimization
formulation and future extensions. The common approach is time-varying pric-
ing (TVP), which charge more money for energy use during peak periods. In
TVP program, the consumer does not have a significant incentive to curtail the
consumption, just the energy is more expensive at certain hours. Others mech-
anisms have been implemented where the user behavior is modified through
economic incentives, therefore, many utilities have employed a change in the
residential electricity rate structure [15]. For instance, Time-of-use (TOU) [3]
program, where the day is divided into adjoining blocks of hours. The price
of energy varies between blocks, but not within blocks; Critical peak pricing
(CPP) [9], is related to TOU, unlike that it is only applied to a small number of
event days; in Real-time pricing (RTP) [2], the price varies hourly according to
the real-time market cost of delivering electricity; Direct load control [6], remote
control of flexible loads; Emergency demand reduction [20], users receive incen-
tive by diminishing energy consumption during emergency events; PTR [24],
where customers receive electricity bill rebates by not consuming (relative to a
previously established, household-specific baseline) during peak periods, which
it is the mechanism studied in this paper; and many other mechanisms.
The baseline is an important concept of the PTR program. A counterfactual
model is developed to estimate the baseline. In [17] shows the critical facts
on the selection of customer baseline, they design a suitable baseline focusing
on administrative and contractual approaches in order to get an efficient DR.
Furthermore, in [8, 25, 1] the performance of DR baselines are studied and
new methods are regarded as establishing the reasonable compensation of the
consumer.
Moreover, in literature, there are some of more theoretical DR programs such
as in [27] by using a smart grid technology, the authors shows a DR program
where a load device could offer retail users coupon incentives to induce DR for
a future period in anticipation of intermittent generation. In [10] a coopera-
tive dynamic DR under different market architecture is proposed to evaluate
the welfare impacts and the efficiency-risk. In addition, [5] devise schemes for
scheduling DR in a deregulated environment. The authors create a new market
concept trough a pool-based market-clearing strategy. In [11] a real-time DR
algorithm is developed. Furthermore, it is possible to find DR program based
on the game theory such as [14] to ensure that users tell the truth in relation to
their reduced power consumption employing a Vicrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism.
In this paper, a rational consumer behavior is studied when he is enrolled in
3a particular DR incentive program based on baseline or counterfactual model
called Peak Time Rebate (PTR). In the economic sense, rational behavior means
that the users maximize their profits given the mechanism of demand energy
reduction. This rebate is calculated using a baseline for each user which is esti-
mated from past energy consumption. In real life, the PTR program has shown
to be an inefficient DR mechanism to improve the demand profile because it al-
lows that some users deliberately increase consumption during baseline-setting
times [26, 19, 12]. Such consumer behavior of altering the baseline is formulated
as a stochastic optimization problem to understand how the users take their de-
cisions of consumption when they are participating in PTR program. While the
user intuitively makes decisions according to the operation of the mechanism,
in this work, a mathematical model of consumer choice is proposed in order to
find solutions to the aforementioned inefficiency of the PTR mechanism.
In this work, the optimal strategy of a user that participates in a PTR
program is studied in order to earn the highest economic profit under uncertain
decisions.The contribution is described as follows:
• The optimal decision problem is posed in general form taking into account
several previous periods of setting-time in a PTR program. The purposed
solution is solved backward in time to find the optimal choice for con-
sumers where consumer uncertainty is modeled as a random variable. In
addition, the choice of the SO is modeled as a binary random variable,
namely, for indicating whether the user is called for participating in PTR
mechanism.
• A closed form solution of a PTR program is derived for two periods. The
previous consumption is assumed as the baseline and the user is always
called to participate in the PTR program. The results show that the
consumer alters the baseline when the incentive exists in the DR program.
Some numerical examples are presented.
The article is organized as follows. Section II describes the preliminary set-
ting. In Section III, the general problem formulation of the PTR program is
developed. Section IV, the mathematical solution for two periods given the op-
timization problem is explained. Section V, the simulation results are shown.
Conclusions are presented in Section VI.
2. Setting
This section presents the notation and assumptions for developing the model.
An individual consumer or aggregated demand (a group of users with the same
or similar preferences) is considered for this DR model. the decision maker’s
preferences are specified by giving utility function G(qt; θt), where qt is the
consumption at time t and θt is a particular realization of random variable Θ.
The randomness Θ are external factors that influence the energy requirements
of the consumer. The randomness in the utility function is modeled as an
additive load requirement, that is, G(qt; θt) = G(qt − θt). Θ is assumed to have
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a probability density function fΘ(θt) with limited support
[
θ, θ
]
and mean zero.
The motivation to choose such additive randomness is that an external event,
such an as a cold wave, will drive the user to increase his energy consumption
until he obtains the same comfort than without the event. Then, given a price,
the effect of the random event is to shift the equilibrium point to the left in this
situation.
The consumer is assumed with risk-averse behavior. Individuals will usually
choose with lower risk, therefore, G(· ) is concave [22]. This behavior reflects
the assumption that marginal utility diminishes as wealth increases. Also, G(· )
is considered smooth, positive and nondecreasing.
A competitive electricity market (consumers are price-takers) is assumed.
Thus, the energy price p is given and constant since the utility company set
an invariable price to the users during the certain period. Then, the following
definitions are stated.
Definition 2.1. The energy total cost is pi(qt) = pqt.
Definition 2.2. The payoff function is defined as Ut (qt, θt) = G(qt−θt)−pi(qt),
which indicates the user benefit of consuming q energy during the interval t.
Definition 2.3. Given G(· ), θt and p, the rational behavior of the consumer
that maximizes the payoff function Ut (qt, θt) is
q∗t (θt) = q + θt (1)
this result is found by solving the optimization problem
q∗t = max
qt∈[0,qmax]
Ut (qt, θt) = G (qt − θt)− pi (qt)
where qmax is the maximum allowable consumption value, q is the optimal
solution to the previous condition when θt = 0.
2.1. Utility function and rebate description
Under assumption that G(· ) is a smooth and concave function, the utility
function can be approximated by a second order polynomial around q. There-
fore, a quadratic function is considered, where the user utility is zero whether his
consumption is zero and saturates after achieving the maximum of the quadratic
form, i.,e.,
G (qt) =
{
− γ2 (qt − q)
2
+ p (qt − q) + k 0 ≤ qt ≤ q +
p
γ
− p
2
2γ +
p2
γ
+ k qt > q +
p
γ
The saturated part is motivated due to the fact that the agent has a limited
well-being with respect to his energy consumption.
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Definition 2.4. Under additive uncertainty and using the previous considera-
tion (1), The utility function can be rewritten as follow:
G (qt − θt) =
{
− γ2 (qt − q
∗
t )
2 + p (qt − q
∗
t ) + k 0 ≤ qt ≤ q
∗
t +
p
γ
− p
2
2γ +
p2
γ
+ k qt > q
∗
t +
p
γ
(2)
where γ and k are constant. In particular, γ depicts consumer private pref-
erences and k is settled when G (qt − θt) = 0 if qt − θt = 0. A similar approach
to model a utility function is found in [18]. A further discussion about γ can be
reviewed in [7]
Note that γ is in dollar or any other currency divided by energy units
squared, therefore, this parameter could be interpreted as the marginal util-
ity that the consumer has as decision-maker into the electricity market. The
first order approximation of ∂G(qt−θt)
∂qt
when 0 ≤ qt ≤ q
∗
t +
p
γ
around q∗t is
∂G(qt − θt)
qt
= p− γ (qt − q
∗
t )
where −γ is the second derivative of G(· ) when 0 ≤ qt ≤ q
∗
t +
p
γ
.
2.2. Rebate definition
Basically, DR programs request customers to curtail demand in response to
a price signal or economic incentive. Typically the invitation to reduce demand
is made for a specific time period. There are three main concepts:
Definition 2.5. Baseline: The amount of energy the user would have consumed
in the absence of a request to reduce (counterfactual model) [4]. This quantity
can not be measured, then it is estimated from the previous consumption of
the agent, i.e., the baseline takes into account qt−1, ..., qt−n. Where n defines
the historical consumer behavior, i.e., n corresponds to the periods taken into
account within the baseline function.
Baseline = b(qt−1, ..., qt−n) (3)
Definition 2.6. Actual Use (qt): The amount of energy the customer actually
consumes during the event period.
Definition 2.7. Load Reduction (△t (b(· ), qt)): The difference between the
baseline and the actual use.
b− qt = △t (b(qt−1, ..., qt−n), qt)
In PTR programs, the rebate is only received if there is an energy reduc-
tion. Otherwise, the user does not get any incentive or penalty (see fig. 1).
Mathematically,
6Baseline = b(qt−1, ..., qt−n)
qt
△t (b(· ), qt) = b(· )− qt
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Figure 1: Baseline and rebate definition
Definition 2.8. Let p2 the rebate price received by the user due to energy
reduction in peak periods. The PTR incentive pi2 is
pi2 (b (qt−1, ..., qt−n) , qt) =
{
p2 (△t (b(qt−1..., qt−n), qt)) = p2(b(qt−1, ..., qt−n)− qt) qt < b
0 qt ≥ b
The consumer payoff function when he is enrolled in a PTR program is
Ut (qt, θt, b(qt−1, ..., qt−n)) = G(qt − θt)− pi(qt) + rpi2(b(qt−1, ..., qt−n), qt) (4)
where r is a particular realization of a binary random variable R representing
whether the consumer is called to participate in the program according to what
the SO decides.
3. General problem formulation
The theories of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern are employed here to model
decision-making under uncertainty. That is, the agent is assumed to behave
as if he maximizes the expected value of the payoff function according to his
actions and possible consequences. The reader can found more informaction in
[23, 22, 16]. Subsequently, the consumer problem is to find the optimal decision
when he is going to participate in a PTR program in order to increase his
personal well-being and economic profit. In addition, the optimization formulae
must include all the possible stochastic scenarios given the uncertainty of the
variable θ.
The general problem formulation from the demand side is:
max
qt,...,qt−n∈[0,qmax]
E [Ut−n (qt−n, θt−n) + ...+ Ut−1 (qt−1, θt−1) + Ut (qt, θt, b(qt−1, ..., qt−n))]
(5)
where E [·] is the expectation operator. The optimization problem takes
n − 1 previous decisions to determine the best choice for all periods including
the choice at the time t. Notice that the rebate price is only received at the
period t (present time), namely, the payoff function at the time t is given by
(4).
7It is important to claim that the baseline could be estimated using several
techniques according to the energy policies of each country or state. In [13] some
methods for baseline calculation are found. The proposed solution for (5) is to
formulate n-stages optimization problems solved backward in time. At stage i,
the realization of θi is known. The stochastic programming algorithm,
1. qo
t
(
qt−1, ..., qt−n; θt
)
= argmaxqt∈[0,qmax] Ut (qt, θt, b(qt−1, ..., qt−n))
2. qo
t−1
(
qt−2, ..., qt−n; θt−1
)
= argmaxqt−1∈[0,qmax] Ut−1 (qt−1, θt−1)
+E
[
Ut
(
qo
t
, θt, b(qt−1, ..., qt−n)
)]
...
n.qo
t−n
(θt−n) = argmaxqt−n∈[0,qmax] Ut−n (qt−n, θt−n)+
E
[
Ut−(n−1)
(
qo
t−n
, θt−n
)
+ ...+ Ut−1
(
qo
t−1
, θt−1
)
+ Ut
(
qo
t
, θt, b(qot−1, q
o
t−2
..., qt−n)
)]
It is vital to highlight that each power consumption period considered in
this algorithm has similar features of consumption, i.e., consumer preferences
and energy costs are the same in each period. For instance, the period between
7 and 8 pm for a week.
This paper focuses on the way to solve (5) for finding a closed form result for
the consumer decision. In the next section, The stochastic optimization problem
is solved for two periods. Furthermore, it is assumed that the user is always
called to participate in PTR program, henceforth r = 1 is considered.
4. Problem formulation for two periods
A single previous period t− 1 is assumed to estimate the baseline in eq. (3).
Then, the baseline is b(qt−1) = qt−1. In this regard, the problem formulation is:
max
qt,qt−1∈[0,qmax]
E [Ut−1 (qt−1, θt−1) + Ut (qt, θt, b(qt−1))] (6)
First, the agent maximizes the energy consumption at the "present" time t,
given that the realization of θt and the value of qt−1 are known.
qot (qt−1; θt) = argmaxqt∈[0,qmax] Ut (qt, θt, b(qt−1))
Second, the decision-maker determines the best consumption for the baseline
setting period, knowing the rational choice qot for the future. The realization of
θt−1 is given and the user faces uncertainty in θt only, i.e.,
qot−1(θt−1) = argmaxqt−1∈[0,qmax] Ut−1 (qt−1, θt−1) + E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
4.1. First-stage stochastic programming
The following result presents the solution qot to the first-stage stochastic
optimization at the time t.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal consumption qot of a user participating in a PTR
program (i.e. the solution of the first-stage stochastic programming), given G(· )
in (2) and Ut(· ) in (4), is:
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q
o
t (qt−1; θt) =


q∗t r = 1 and qt−1 − q +
p2
2γ
< θt ≤ θ strategy A
q∗t −
p2
γ
r = 1 and p2
γ
− q < θt ≤ qt−1 − q +
p2
2γ
strategy B
0 r = 1 and θ ≤ θt ≤
p2
γ
− q strategy C
q∗t r = 0 strategy D
Note that when the SO calls the user (r = 1), strategy A means that the
user decides rationally to spend q∗ of energy (That is, he does not reduce energy
consumption), strategy B depicts whether the consumer chooses to diminish the
demand to q∗t −
p2
γ
and finally, strategy C is when the best decision is to consume
zero energy.
According to theorem 4.1, note that the best decision depends on the real-
ization of θt. Then, the user chooses a strategy at the time t given his actual
demand. The proof is shown in appendix A.
Corollary 4.2. The expected value of the load qot is:
E [qot (qt−1; θt)] =


q r = 1 and p2 ≤ 2γ (q − qt−1) strategy A
q − p2
γ
r = 1 and 2γ (q − qt−1) < p2 ≤ qγ strategy B
0 r = 1 and qγ < p2 strategy C
q r = 0 strategy D
The expected value of consumer payoff E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
is found as-
suming a continuos uniform distribution function fΘ(θt). Since r = 1, from
theorem 4.1, the consumer has three availables strategies according to the re-
alization of uncertainty θt. In addition, the random variable is symmetric with
respect to zero. Whether strategies A, B and C are feasible according to the
parameters θ, θ, p2, γ, q and the variable qt−1 then these stategies is within the
probability density function of θt which it is shown in fig. 2.
Looking in detail the intervals of θt that define strategy C, these depend
of constant values, whereas the intervals for strategies A and B depend on the
optimization variable qt−1. Therefore, the probabilistic events change with qt−1.
For instance, strategy A has zero probability when qt−1 > θ + q −
p2
2γ .
fΘ(θt)
θ θ
p2
γ
− q qt−1 − q +
p2
2γ
ABC
θt
Figure 2: User optimal strategies within θt probability density function.
Corollary 4.3. The expected value of the payoff in t, E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
,
depends on the probabilities of available strategies. Therefore, a construction by
cases is employed to solve E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
. There are three main cases:
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case 1: θ > p2
γ
− q, strategy C does not exist. Then, E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
depends on the value of qt−1. Therefore,
E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)
; θ > p2
γ
− q
]
=

EA =
´ θ
θ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt qt−1 ∈
[
0, q + θ − p22γ
]
EAB =
´ θ
qt−1−q+
p2
2γ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ qt−1−q+ p22γ
θ Ut
(
q∗t −
p2
γ
)
fΘ(θt)dθt
qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , q + θ −
p2
2γ
]
EB =
´ θ
θ
Ut
(
q∗t −
p2
γ
)
fΘ(θt)dθt qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , qmax
]
case 2: θ ≤ p2
γ
− q < θ, strategy C has positive probability. Therefore,
E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
is given by:
E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)
; θ ≤ p2
γ
− q < θ
]
=

EA =
´ θ
θ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt qt−1 ∈
[
0, q + θ − p22γ
]
EAC =
´ θ
qt−1−q+
p2
2γ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ qt−1−q+ p22γ
θ Ut (0 )fΘ(θt)dθt
qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ ,
p2
2γ
]
EABC =
´ θ
qt−1−q+
p2
2γ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ qt−1−q+ p22γ
p2
γ
−q
Ut
(
q∗t −
p2
γ
)
fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ p2
γ
−q
θ Ut (0) fΘ(θt)dθt
qt−1 ∈
[
p2
2γ , q + θ −
p2
2γ
]
EBC =
´ θ
p2
γ
−q
Ut
(
q∗t −
p2
γ
)
fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ p2
γ
−q
θ Ut (0) fΘ(θt)dθt
qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , qmax
]
case 3: p2
γ
− q ≥ θ, a priori, strategy C has probability one. However, the
main point is qt−1 − q +
p2
γ
then it could be exist other strategies different from
C. Thus, E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)]
is given by:
E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)
; p2
γ
− q ≥ θ
]
=

EA =
´ θ
θ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt qt−1 ∈
[
0, q + θ − p22γ
]
EAC′ =
´ θ
qt−1−q+
p2
2γ
Ut (q
∗
t ) fΘ(θt)dθt+
´ qt−1−q+ p22γ
θ Ut (0 )fΘ(θt)dθt
qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , q + θ −
p2
2γ
]
EC ==
´ θ
θ
Ut (0) fΘ(θt)dθt qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , qmax
]
Note that the expected value E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt , qt−1
)]
is a piecewise function
that depends on the value of qt−1.
4.2. Second-stage stochastic programming
For the second-stage, the rational choice for qot is known and the realization
of θt−1 is given. Then q
o
t−1 is found by using the result of theorem 4.1. The
optimization problem is:
4.2 Second-stage stochastic programming 10
qo
t−1
(θt−1) = argmaxqt−1≥0 G (qt−1 − θt−1)−pqt−1+E [G (q
o
t
− θt)− pq
o
t
+ rpi2 (qt−1,q
o
t
)]
(7)
The mathematical solution of (7) is developed in the following three theo-
rems for each case mentioned in the corollary 4.3 and the proofs are found in
appendixes B, C, and D.
Theorem 4.4. Given θ > p2
γ
− q (case 1) and q + p
γ
> q + θ − p22γ , then the
optimal solution qot−1 for (7) is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1)
]
=


q − p22γ +
2p2θ
2θγ−p2
0 ≤ p2 <
2
3θγ
q + p2
γ
2
3θγ ≤ p2 < p
qmax p ≤ p2 < γ (θ + q)
Theorem 4.5. Given θ ≤ p2
γ
− q < θ (case 2) and q+ p
γ
> q+ θ− p22γ , then the
optimal solution qot−1 for (7) is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1)
]
=


q − p22γ +
2p2θ
2θγ−p2
γ (θ + q) ≤ p2 <
2
3θγ
q + p2
γ
2
3θγ ≤ p2 < p
qmax p < p2 ≤ γ
(
θ + q
)
Theorem 4.6. Given p2
γ
− q ≥ θ (case 3) and q + p
γ
> q + θ − p22γ , then the
optimal solution qot−1 for (7) is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1)
]
=
{
q + p2
γ
γ
(
θ + q
)
≤ p2 < p
qmax p2 > p
Theorems 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 present the optimal consumption qt−1 given the
solutions of theorem 4.1. For theorem 4.4, the result is rigthful for incentives
less than γ (θ + q), which means that strategy C does not exist. In addition,
the saturation part of the consumer (see equation (2)) is q + θ − p22γ < q +
p
γ
<
qmax, namely, when E
[
Ut
(
qot , θt, b(qt−1)
)
; θ > p2
γ
− q
]
is strategy B, specifi-
cally, qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ − p22γ , qmax
]
. Whether the user has low uncertainty, the
theorem 4.4 is employed for estimating optimal decision at the time t− 1. Note
that if 0 ≤ p2 <
2
3θγ the solutions is decreasing with respect to p2, therefore,
the situation when the incentive is too small, it is risky to increase the energy
consumption at the baseline setting period. Nonetheless, this event is not com-
mon owing to the incentive is equal or greater than retail price. Next, whether
2
3θγ ≤ p2 < p then the optimal strategies is to increase q +
p2
γ
. Finally, if the
incentive is greater than p then the optimal choice is to increase the energy
consumption as much as possible. Moreover, The meaning of theorem 4.5 is the
same than the theorem 4.5. However, the consumer uncertainty is larger and
the incentive limit is given by γ (θ + q) < p2 < γ
(
θ + q
)
. Finally, theorem 4.6 is
valid for p2 ≥ γ
(
θ + q
)
and p > γθ− p22 . Note that there are only two solutions
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that depend on incentive p2. The uncertainty is greater than the previous two
theorems. In general, The saturation of consumer preferences causes that the
user wastes energy.
5. Numerical examples
In this section, simulation results are presented to illustrate the optimal
behavior of a user when he is participating in a PTR program. The utility
function for this example is
G (qt − θt) =
{
− γ2 (qt − q
∗
t )
2
+ p (qt − q
∗
t ) +
γ
2 q
2 + pq 0 ≤ qt ≤ q +
p
γ
+ θt
pq + p
2
2γ +
γq2
2 qt > q +
p
γ
+ θt
The retail price is p = 0.26$/kWh (based on peak summer rate in 10/1/16 by
Pacific Gas and Electric Company in San Francisco, California), deterministic
baseline q = 8kWh and the curvature γ = 0.05. Randomness θt for each period
has been created as a uniform random variable with zero mean and with simetric
support. A Monte Carlo simulation is performed with 10000 realizations of θt
for each value of qt−1.
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End
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Figure 3: Flowchart to calculate the expected value of Ut(· )
The flowchart in fig. 3. shows the conditions to determine the case that
the user faces for choosing his decision according to the value of qt−1, in order
to solve the expected value in (7). This flowchart is derived from fig. 2 and
corollary 4.3 by analyzing when strategies have positive probability.
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Figure 4: Incentives analysis.
5.1. Incentives analysis
In this subsection, the effect of the incentive p2 on the load and user utility
at time t given the baseline qt−1 is studied by changing the reward p2. For this
analysis, θt ∼ unif [−0.25q, 0.25q] and qmax = 20kWh are assumed. In fig. 4
are shown three different situations that depend on the incentive value. The
first column, the reward p2 is presented for each situation. The second one, the
plot of energy consumptions at the time t versus the consumption at the time
t − 1 are shown according to the incentive. Third column, the expected value
of profit function based on the decisions at time t− 1.
First, the event when the incentive is lower than retail price, i.e., p2 < p
is evaluated. For p2 = 0.15$/kWh, the optimal solution is to increase energy
consumption at the period t − 1, close to qt−1 = q + θt−1 +
p2
γ
= 11kWh and
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reduce energy consumption at t to qot = q + θt −
p2
γ
= 5kWh. Next, when the
incentive and the retail price are the same p2 = p. The rational user consumes
at the past time whatever value comprising in qt−1 = [11kWh, 20kWh], then,
taking into account the worst event, the user consumes qt−1 = 20kWh, therefore,
the optimal consumption at the time t, it is qot = q+θt−
p2
γ
= 2.79kWh. Finally,
the situation when the incentive is greater than retail price, namely, p2 > p is
assessed. For p2 = 0.45$/kWh, the optimal behavior is to consume as much
energy as possible, qt−1 = qmax, irrespective of parameters γ, q, θ and θ. If
the maximum value is qt−1 = 20kWh then, he would consume zero energy
qt = 0kWh at the time t in order to get the maximum profit. These behaviors
are predicted by corollary 4.2 and theorem 4.4.
p2 ($/kWh) Expected profit ($) q
o
t−1 (kWh) q
o
t (kWh) q
o
t−1 + q
o
t (kWh)
0 3.2 8 8 16
0.15 3.65 11 5 16
0.26 4.55 20 2.79 22.79
0.45 8.13 20 0 20
Table 1: Comparison of optimal user strategies under different incentives.
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Figure 5: Optimal consumption and profit with 25% of uncertainty.
The previous results are summarized in table 1. Whether the user is not
called or the incentive is zero then the trivial solution is not to alter his behavior.
On the other hand, when the price incentive is higher than zero but lower than
the retail price (p2 = 0.15), the user is induced to raise his consumption to alter
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the baseline and get the highest economic benefits by reducing the consumption
at time t, getting a profit of $3.65. Likewise, whether the agent gets an incentive
equal or greater than the retail price then he alters his consumption up to the
maximum possible load to maximize the profit to $4.55 or $8.13 according to
the incentive, consuming much more energy than in the previous situations.This
alteration of the baseline causes economic inefficiency to the SO. A mechanism
design should be designed in order to manage properly the signal r to face this
problem when the DR program is based on baseline method.
Lastly, in fig. 5 are shown the optimal consumption at the time t− 1 and t,
the net consumption (qt+qt−1) and the expected value of consumer profit versus
the incentive payment p2. The optimal decision at the setting time is to increase
the consumption as the incentive is raising, namely, the user alters the baseline
in order to improve his profit. Note that whether p2 > 0.26$/kWh the energy
expenditure is saturated to qmax = 20kWh. In addition, the rational choice at
the period t is to diminish the energy consumption to receive the benefits of
participating in the PTR program. For p2 > 0.4$/kWh, the consumed energy
goes to zero. Besides, whether p2 ∈ [0, 0.26) $/kWh, the net consumption is
less or equal to 16kWh, that is, the user shifts his energy consumption. On the
other hand, for p2 > 0.26$/kWh, the user spends more energy that he needs,
taking into account all periods. Finally, the expected value of consumer profit
is an increasing function, thus, the incentive payment improve the consumer
benefits. However, the PTR mechanism is favorable for the SO as long as p2 < p
because the consumer is shifting his energy consumption. In other situations,
the incentive goes against with the objectives of a DR program.
5.2. Uncertainty variation
In this part, user behaviors for different uncertainty levels are analyzed. The
realization of uniform random variable θt is settled with four different supports
in order to assess the uncertainty. These supports are proposed as percentages
of the deterministic baseline q. For this survey are considered the following
percentages: 10%, 30%, 50% and 90%. In fig 6 is compared the optimal decision
qt for all the stated uncertainties. Note that the optimal choice at time t does
not depend on the uncertainty level owing to in this period. Moreover, in fig
8 is shown the rational choices at the period t − 1. For p2 ∈ [0, 0.26), the
user with high uncertainty (e.g. with 50%) should spend less energy than a
predictable consumer (e.g. with 10%) since his consumption is unknown then
he reduces his consumption for facing this variation and pursuing the benefits of
the PTR program.Whether the incentive is greater than the retail price, hence,
all decisions are saturated. Furthermore, A similar behavior is found whether
the net consumption is analyzed (see fig. 7). It is vital to restate that the
consumption variation is perceived when the incentive is lower than the retail
price. Lastly, In fig. 9 is presented the expected value of consumer profit. The
expected profits are the same for all percentages because each situation has the
same preferences. In brief, the uncertainty affects low payments of incentive,
therefore, the user does not have certainty related to his consumption pattern
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under this conditions, then, his best strategy is to be cautious and spend less
energy than a predictable consumer.
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Figure 6: Optimal decision for qt with un-
certainty of 10%, 30%, 50% and 90% ac-
cording to the incentive.
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tainty of 10%, 30%, 50% and 90% accord-
ing to the incentive.
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90% according to the incentive.
Finally, in fig 10 is shown a thermal graph of the net optimal consumption
according to the incentive price p2 and uncertainty variation θt as a plot sum-
mary. An important threshold is when the incentive is equal to the retail price,
i.e., p2 = 0.26$/kWh . Even more, the maximum consumption is detected when
p2 is just slightly higher than p2, rising around 22 kWh represented by a yellow
color. In this situation, the optimal consumption does not change with the un-
certainty level. In addition, the rational consumption decreases for incentives
between 0.26$/kWh to 0.4$/kWh. For higher incentives, the net consumption
remains constant in 20kWh. On the other hand, when the incentive is lower
than the retail price, the optimal consumption depends on uncertainty varia-
tion. If a user is not sure of his demand then the optimal choice is to consume
less energy than a predictable consumer. In particular, this non-linear pattern
16
is depicted by variations in blue tones of fig 10. Furthermore, the maximum en-
ergy consumption is 16 kWh for p2 lower than p, therefore, a rational consumer
shifts or reduces his load requirement under this incentive conditions.
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Figure 10: Thermal graph of optimal decisions given the incentive and uncertainty variation.
6. Conclusions
In this paper was analyzed the rational behavior of a consumer that par-
ticipates in a PTR program within an electricity market. The problem was
addressed using a stochastic programming algorithm. A closed-form solution
was found for a two-periods framework. The previous consumption was taken
as the baseline and it was assumed that the user is always called to participate
in the PTR program. The formulation allowed linking the consumer decisions
among different consumption periods. Furthermore, uncertainty in load require-
ments was considered and coupled through conditional expectation.
It was found that a rational user changes his consumption pattern in or-
der to alter the baseline construction and increase his well-being. Whether the
incentive is lower than the regular energy price, the user’s best strategy is to
shift the energy consumption from the DR event to the baseline settling period.
Otherwise, whether the incentive is greater than the retail price then the con-
sumer maximizes his profits consuming as much energy as possible during the
baseline setting period, harming the system reliability. In addition, the effect
of uncertainty in the consumer energy requirement was analyzed. It was found
that the best decision for a consumer with high uncertainty is to spend less
energy than a predictable user.
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PTR programs aim to induce users to reduce their energy consumption dur-
ing a peak event. However, the analysis of the proposed model showed that
in most cases, users shift or increase their demand in order to maximize their
profits. Only those consumers with high levels of uncertainty reduce their con-
sumption when the incentive is lower than the retail price. Therefore, it was
found that a PTR program is not suitable if the SO is seeking a net reduction
of energy consumption on the demand side.
For future works, a mechanism design for the demand side would be a signifi-
cant improvement for DR programs based on baseline methods. This mechanism
should include a participation condition or what should be the minimum incen-
tive in order to motivate energy reduction or shifting, this property is known
as individual rationality constraint. Furthermore, incentive-compatible, bud-
get balance and efficiency should be evaluated for this kind of incentive-based
demand response programs. Moreover, the key solution is associated with con-
trolling properly the user participation. Therefore, it could be interesting to
discuss what kind of technology is required to follow the consumer behavior
under this program in order to ensure system efficiency.
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Appendix A. Proof of the Theorem 4.1
Proof. The optimization problem is analyzed by intervals according to the es-
tablished setting. Then the global maximum is found.
Strategy A1: r = 1 (Called), qot ≥ qt−1 (Non-participant) and 0 ≤ q
o
t ≤
q∗t +
p
γ
(G non-saturated)
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[0,q∗t+
p
γ ]
−
γ
2
(qt − q
∗
t )
2
+ p (qt − q
∗
t ) + k − pqt
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q0t = q
∗
t = q + θt (A.1)
Strategy A2: r = 1 (Called), qot ≥ qt−1(Non-participant) and q
o
t > q
∗
t +
p
γ
(G saturated).
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[q∗t+
p
γ
,qmax] −
p2
2γ
+
p2
γ
+ k − pqt
This function is unbounded below. The corner solution is
qot = q
∗
t +
p
γ
(A.2)
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Comparing the optimal solutions (A.1) and (A.2), the optimal strategy is
(A.1) when the user is called but does not participate in DR.
Strategy B1: r = 1 (Called), qot < qt−1 (Participant), and 0 ≤ q
o
t ≤ q
∗
t +
p
γ
(G non-saturated).
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[0,q∗t+
p
γ ]
−
γ
2
(qt − q
∗
t )
2
+ p (qt − q
∗
t ) + k − pqt + p2 (qt−1 − qt)
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q0t = q
∗
t −
p2
γ
= q + θt −
p2
γ
(A.3)
Strategy B2: r = 1 (Called), qot < qt−1 (Participant) and q
o
t > q
∗
t +
p
γ
(Saturated).
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[q∗t+
p
γ
,qmax] −
p2
2γ
+
p2
γ
+ k − pqt + p2 (qt−1 − qt)
This function is unbounded below. The corner solution is
qot = q
∗
t +
p
γ
(A.4)
Comparing the optimal solutions (A.3) and (A.4), the optimal strategy is
(A.3) when the user is called and participates in DR.
Strategy C: Importantly, the incentive p2 can be so high to drive (A.3) neg-
ative values. As there is no sense in a negative consumption, the problem is
limited to [0, qmax], then
qot = 0 if θt ≤
p2
γ
− q (A.5)
Strategy D1: r = 0 (Non-called) and 0 ≤ qot ≤ q
∗
t +
p
γ
(Non-saturated)
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[0,q∗t+
p
γ ]
−
γ
2
(qt − q
∗
t )
2
+ p (qt − q
∗
t ) + k − pqt
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q0t = q
∗
t = q + θt (A.6)
Strategy D2: r = 0 (Non-called) and qot > q
∗
t +
p
γ
(saturated)
[
qot
]
= argmax
qt∈[q∗t+
p
γ
,qmax] −
p2
2γ
+
p2
γ
+ k − pqt
This function is unbounded below. The corner solution is
qot = q
∗
t +
p
γ
(A.7)
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Comparing (A.6) and (A.7), the optimal strategy when the user is not called
is (A.6).
Note that, when called (r = 1), the user decides to participate (Strategy B)
when qot < qt−1, i.e., θt < qt−1 − q +
p2
γ
. While the user does not participate
(Strategy A) when qot > qt−1, i.e., θt > qt−1 − q. Then, for any realization of
the additive uncertainty θt within the interval qt−1 − q < θt < qt−1 − q +
p2
γ
,
there are two local maxima.
In order to find the global solution, the payoff in strategies A and B are com-
pared. The critical value of θt that provides the same payoff in both strategies
is:
U
(
q + θt −
p2
γ
, θt, qt−1
)
= U (q + θt, θt, qt−1) (A.8)
Solving for θt,
θt = qt−1 − q +
p2
2γ
(A.9)
Eq. (A.9) gives the limit of the uncertain load when the user commutes from
strategy A to strategy B.
Organizing by intervals the results (A.6), (A.1), (A.3) and (A.5), the solution
is given by theorem 4.1.
Appendix B. Proof of the Theorem 4.4
Proof. Let r = 1, i.e., the user is always called to participate in the PTR
program. Under the assumption (see the corollary 4.3 or the fig. 3) that θ >
p2
γ
− q, namely, strategy C does not exist in the density probability function
fθ (θt) (See fig. 2 with zero probability for strategy C). Also, it is assumed that
θ = −θ and θ > p2
γ
− q and the parameters q and p2 are positives.
Subsequently, the net payoff function for all periods is given by figure B.11.
Notice that the intervarls are given when the conditions qt−1 − q +
p2
2γ is equal
to θ and θ. Besides, the saturation part according the utility function (equation
(2)) is assumed between q+ θ− p22γ ≤ q+
p
γ
≤ qmax. This assumption about the
saturation part is motivated due to θ is relatively small when the user has not
too much uncertainty. Thus, an optimization problem is formulated by intervals
according to strategies that are feasible. Then, the maximum global is found
comparing all the local maxima.
20
q + θ − p2
2γ q + θ −
p2
2γ
qmax
S
tr
a
te
g
y
A
S
tr
a
te
g
ie
s
A
a
n
d
B
S
tr
a
te
g
y
B
qt−1
U
t
−
1
(q
t
−
1
,θ
t
−
1
)
+
E
[U
t
(q
o t
,θ
t
,q
t
−
1
)]
q + p
γ
G non− saturated G saturated
Figure B.11: Net payoff function when strategy C does not exist.
The first local maximum is found when strategy A is feasible.[
qot−1
]
= argmaxqt−1 G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EA
s.t. 0 ≤ qt−1 ≤ q + θ −
p2
2γ
The Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions for the above formulations are:
∂
∂qt−1
(G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EA) + µ1 − µ2 = 0
0 ≤ qt−1⊥µ1 ≥ 0
qt−1 ≤ q + θ −
p2
2γ ⊥ µ2 ≥ 0
Being the E [θt−1] = 0, it is found that:
E
[
q
o
t−1
(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q and qt−1 ∈
[
0, q + θ −
p2
2γ
]]
=
{
0 −q > 0
q q ≥ 0 and p2 < 2γθ
q + θ −
p2
2γ p2 ≥ 2γθ
Therefore the unique feseable solution for this situation is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q and qt−1 ∈
[
0, q + θ −
p2
2γ
]]
= q+θ−
p2
2γ
p2 ≥ 0
(B.1)
In addition, The sufficient condition is guaranteed, i.e., −γ < 0
Next, local maxima when strategies A and B are feasible is found solving
the following optimization problem:[
qot−1
]
= argmaxqt−1 G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EAB
s.t. q + θ − p22γ ≤ qt−1 ≤ q + θ −
p2
2γ
A similar analysis using KKT conditions yields the following result:
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E
[
q
o
t−1
(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q and qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ −
p2
2γ
, q + θ −
p2
2γ
]]
=


q + θ −
p2
2γ p2 < 2θγ
q −
p2
2γ +
p2
(
θ−3θ
)
2
((
θ−θ
)
γ−p2
) 2θγ ≤ p2 < 23 θγ
q + θ −
p2
2γ p2 ≥
2
3 θγ
Then as well, p2 is positive, resulting
E
[
qo
t−1
(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q and qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ −
p2
2γ , q + θ −
p2
2γ
]]
=
 q −
p2
2γ +
p2
(
θ−3θ
)
2
((
θ−θ
)
γ−p2
) 0 ≤ p2 < 23 θγ
q + θ −
p2
2γ p2 ≥
2
3 θγ
(B.2)
However, the sufficient condition is met when p2 < γ
(
θ − θ
)
. In other
circumstances, the solution will be a corner. Given that γ
(
θ − θ
)
> 23θγ then
the solution is the same.
Finally, the local maximum when strategy B is feasible.[
qot−1
]
= argmaxqt−1 G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EB
s.t. q + θ − p22γ ≤ qt−1 ≤ qmax
which has the following solution,
E
[
q
o
t−1
(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q and qt−1 ∈
[
q + θ −
p2
2γ
, qmax
]]
=
{
q + θ −
p2
2γ 0 ≤ p2 <
2
3 θγ
q +
p2
γ
2
3 θγ ≤ p2 < p
qmax p2 ≥ p
(B.3)
Furthermore, The minimum condition is guaranteed, i.e., −γ < 0.
Lastly, comparing the net payoff at the local maxima given by (B.1), (B.2)
and (B.3). The global solution is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1) | θ >
p2
γ
− q
]
=


q − p22γ +
2p2θ
2θγ−p2
0 ≤ p2 <
2
3θγ
q + p2
γ
2
3θγ ≤ p2 < p
qmax p ≤ p2 < γ (θ + q)
Appendix C. Proof of the theorem 4.5
Proof. The mathematical expression p2
γ
− q is located within the limits of the
probability density function (see fig. 2). Furthermore, q + p
γ
> q + p
γ
, i.e., the
saturated point is when strategies B and C are feasible as it is shown in fig.
C.12. Also, let θ ≤ p2
γ
− q < θ.
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Figure C.12: Net payoff function when strategy C is inside of probability density function.
It is uncomplicated to show the following statements
max
qt−1
G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EAB = max
qt−1
G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EABC
max
qt−1
G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EB = max
qt−1
G (qt−1 − θt−1)− pqt−1 + EBC
Therefore, the last two zones (
[
qmax, q + θ −
p2
2γ
]
and
[
q + θ − p22γ ,
p2
2γ
]
) from
fig.B.11 and fig. C.12 have some similarities. Whether the reader follows the
same steps of the proof of the theorem 4.4 then the solution for this theorem is:
E
[
qot−1(θt−1) | θ <
p2
γ
− q < θ
]
=


q − p22γ +
2p2θ
2θγ−p2
γ (θ + q) ≤ p2 <
2
3θγ
q + p2
γ
2
3θγ ≤ p2 < p
qmax p < p2 ≤ γ
(
θ + q
)
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Appendix D. Proof of the theorem 4.6
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Figure D.13: Net payoff function when strategy C is greater than θ.
This theorem is proved using the same procedure than theorem (4.4) and
(4.5).
Fig. D.13 depicts all the zones feasible for this case.
—————–
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